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With the ever-increasing international flavor of business comes an
important question for United States patent holders and foreign
manufacturers alike: Can a company be held liable for patent infringement
in the United States for selling an infringing product abroad that is later
imported into the United States?

IMPORTATION AS AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT
¶1

Making, selling, or using a U.S.-patented product or process in a foreign country does not infringe the

United States patent.2 United States law cannot govern in other countries, and the patentee’s remedy is
therefore dependent on the laws of the relevant foreign country. But when the patented product (or the
product of the patented process) is brought into the United States, U.S. law has the authority to provide a
remedy.
¶2

Prior to 1988, importation was not one of a patent holder’s exclusive rights under U.S. patent law.

The 1988 Process Patent Amendment Act added section 271(g) to the Patent Act, making the importation of a
product made by a patented process an act of infringement.3 However, it was not until 1996 that the Patent
Act was effectively amended to add importation of a patented product as an exclusive right. This amendment
was made as a result of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) agreement of the 1994
Uruguay Round trade agreements, which resolved that importation was to be an exclusive right possessed by
patent holders. The 1994 Uruguay Agreements Act, effective in 1996, amended section 154 of the Patent Act
to add “importing the invention into the United States,” and amended 35 U.S.C. § 271 to add “import into the
United States” in various subsections, most notably § 271(a).4
¶3

This iBrief examines the infringement liability of a foreign seller or manufacturer for sales of

products abroad that find their way into the United States and are subsequently alleged to infringe a United
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States patent due to the importation. It is assumed that jurisdiction over the foreign seller or manufacturer can
be obtained. The two types of infringement, direct and indirect, are considered.

DIRECT INFRINGEMENT
¶4

Direct infringement actions against the unauthorized importation of a patented product are based on

35 U.S.C. § 271(a), while those against the unauthorized importation of the product of a patented process are
based on 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). Although both subsections are of relatively recent origin, the question of
whether a foreign manufacturer could be held liable for direct infringement of a United States patent for
selling an infringing product abroad that later gets imported in the United States has found its way into the
case law.
¶5

In Pfizer Inc. v. Aceto Corp., a foreign manufacturer located and operating in China was sued under

§ 271(g) for infringement of a United States patent for a process of making flavor enhancers.5 The
manufacturer did not itself import the product of the allegedly infringing process into the U.S., but sold the
product in China to another Chinese corporation, who in turn sold it to a Delaware corporation that imported
the product. The court granted the manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment, noting that “[n]othing in
the language [of § 271(g)] suggests that a foreign manufacturer, who does not import the product into the
United States, may be liable simply because it can foresee that a buyer of its product may ultimately import it
into the United States.”6 The court also noted that the legislative history supported a finding that “the
offending act is the importation.”7 Since the foreign manufacturer did not bring the product into the United
States itself (nor did it foresee the importation of the patented product), it was not an “importer” within the
meaning of § 271(g).
¶6

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois applied the logic of Pfizer v. Aceto in

dismissing on summary judgment an infringement suit against a Japanese manufacturer of cooling fans who
sold the fans in Japan to Japanese automakers who subsequently imported the fans into the U.S.8 The holder
of the U.S. patent on a method for molding fans alleged infringement, asserting that the foreign manufacturer
was “intimately and directly involved” in importing the fans and that, “at the very least, aided and abetted it
customers to import the fans.”9 The court relied on Pfizer v. Aceto to find that the foreign manufacturer had
not committed infringement, noting that “[t]he primary target of section 271(g) is not the manufacturer who
manufactured the patented process; rather, the primary target is the importer of the patented process.”10
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¶7

In Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Electronics Ltd., a court again applied the logic of Pfizer v.

Aceto, this time to a case of an alleged § 271(a) infringement of a patent on a product.11 Smoothline, a Hong
Kong corporation, entered into agreements in Hong Kong to manufacture cordless telephones in China for an
American intermediary, who would then sell to another American company planning to import the phones
into the United States. The court found that all importation activity was performed by the American importer.
While the American importer may have directly infringed the patents, the court found that because
Smoothline did not itself import the products into the U.S., it did not directly infringe. The court noted that
“[a]s [35 U.S.C. § 271(a)] makes clear, and as the Federal Circuit has recently reiterated, the only activities
that are relevant to direct infringement are those activities that take place within the borders of the United
States. Extraterritorial activities are irrelevant.”12 The court even went so far as to suggest that a ruse used to
shield a foreign company from infringement liability might be possible: “[w]hile it may be that what
Smoothline did in this case could be said to violate the ‘spirit’ of the patent statute, and/or that it avoids
liability only by maintaining the ‘fiction’ of another entity . . . acting as the ‘importer’ of record, this is
beyond the control of the Court . . . . The current statute does not provide relief.”13 Therefore, although an
entity may engage in questionable behavior that may be directly linked to wrongful importation activities, it
does not appear to constitute direct infringement under the relevant statute.
¶8

Case law suggests that a case can be made for a foreign seller’s liability where direct infringement by

a foreign seller was found based on a related buyer’s domestic sale (not importation) and the seller’s heavy
involvement in that domestic sale.14 However, such a case has yet to arise where the buyer’s direct
infringement was based on its importation. It is conceivable that a seller’s heavy involvement in a buyers
importation might also be viewed skeptically and possibly considered to constitute illegal importation.
INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT
¶9

In addition to direct infringement, United States patent law also allows for the imposition of liability

for infringement upon those who, although they have not directly infringed the patent themselves, have aided
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or abetted another’s direct infringement.15 Section 271 provides for two exclusive rights against indirect
infringement, inducement of infringement under § 271(b) and contributory infringement under § 271(c).16
¶10

Section 271(c) codified the prohibition against the more common type of indirect infringement and

explicitly required only proof of an alleged infringer’s knowledge - not intent - that its actions caused
infringement in order to establish liability.17 Case law has established that the knowledge required is not only
that the component was especially made or adapted for a particular use but also knowledge of the patent
which proscribed the use.18
¶11

Section 271(b) codified the rest of the prohibited types of indirect infringement with much broader

language than § 271(c). Section 271(b) does not contain within its language any mention of an intent
requirement. However, “in view of the very definition of ‘active inducement’ in pre-1952 case law and the
fact that § 271(b) was intended as merely a codification of pre-1952 law,” the Federal Circuit has stated that
“proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to
finding active inducement.”19 The proof of intent requirement for active inducement of infringement is more
strenuous than the proof of knowledge required to show contributory infringement under § 271(c), although
this knowledge requirement is incorporated into the intent required to be shown for active inducement.20
¶12

There is an absence of case law involving the liability of a foreign seller for indirect infringement

where the buyer’s direct infringement is importing the infringing product. However, the foreign seller’s
liability for indirect infringement is probably more a function of its own activities than those that resulted in
the direct infringement.

Active Inducement of Infringement
¶13

While there is no clear decision on the issue, a limited number of decisions suggest that a foreign

manufacturer may be liable for inducement of infringement for actions carried out in a foreign country.
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However, as is always the case for indirect infringement, there must also be direct infringement occurring
within the United States.
¶14

In the 1973 case Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit found that active inducement of infringement occurs when a foreign manufacturer does not
itself import and sell the infringing products, but has a distribution agreement with the importer that showed
the foreign manufacturer’s intent “to invade the United States market at a time when [the manufacturer] was
fully aware of [the patentee’s] United States patents.”21 Additionally, the court found that the manufacturer
had engaged in activities related to the importation: it had provided the importer with instruction booklets in
English, agreed to assist in publicizing the product, maintained the right to inspect and gather information
about the importer’s business affairs, agreed to indemnify the importer for patent infringement claims, and
received credit from the manufacturer against invoices for after-sale repairs performed in the United States.22
Several pre-Uruguay Agreements Act district court cases cite Honeywell for the principle that “[t]he inducing
activity may take place outside of the United States, so long as the direct infringement occurs within the
United States.”23 Therefore some activities performed by a foreign seller, if significant, can constitute active
inducement of infringement by importation.
¶15

Two 2001 cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, authored by Judge Rader,

did not clarify the issue. In Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics International, Inc., the
court agreed with the finding in Honeywell that an action for inducement to infringe can be based on acts
performed outside the United States.24 A foreign manufacturer was accused of infringing a method claim of a
United States patent because it had designed, manufactured, and sold a product (an integrated circuit chip that
contained circuitry for carrying out the patented method) to a customer abroad who imported and distributed
the chip in the United States. The court held that the jury’s verdict that the foreign manufacturer had
committed active inducement to infringe was supported by substantial evidence.25 The court noted that
because the foreign manufacturer did not practice the method in the United States, it “cannot be liable for
direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). [The manufacturer’s] acts in connection with selling its
chip to [the distributor], however, constitute active inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).”26
¶16

However, in the second case, Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., the Federal Circuit found that a Chinese

manufacturer of the allegedly infringing product who sold the products in China to a second company that
imported and sold the products to another company for distribution could not be held liable for infringement
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under § 271 either alone or jointly because “all of [the manufacturer’s] activities took place in Shanghai.”27
The court noted that “[t]o be liable for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271, a party must make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States, or import into the United States the patented invention.” The language
used by the court did not explicitly mention particular subsections of § 271 and so did not distinguish between
direct and indirect liability for infringement. Therefore, one possible interpretation of this section of Shockley
is that in citing § 271, the court was only referring to direct infringement, and thus the case is consistent with
the language of Crystal Semiconductor.

Contributory Infringement
¶17

While there exists support for the idea that an action that constitutes active inducement to infringe can

be based on activities the defendant performed abroad, the result may not be the same for contributory
infringement. Read literally, § 271(c) refers only to one who “offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States.”28 This could mean that a company that makes a component in another
country and sells the component to someone who imports it into the United States would not be liable for
contributory infringement, even if the manufacturer knows the buyer will import the component. While there
is still the possibility of an action against the manufacturer for active inducement of infringement (because §
271(b) does not contain a geographical limitation), the level of intent required is higher for active inducement
of infringement than for contributory infringement, as discussed above. There is, however, no suggestion in
the legislative history of the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act which amended § 271(c) to suggest there
was to be a change in the operation of the provision other than adding two new exclusive rights: “offers to
sell” and “imports.”29
¶18

However, a pair of district court cases decided prior to the enactment of the Uruguay Round

Agreements Act found contributory infringement based on a company’s activity in another country. In Lucas
Aerospace, Ltd. V. Unison Industries, L.P., a foreign manufacturer supplying a component to a Canadian
company who in turn imported the component as part of its product was found liable for contributory
infringement.30 In upholding the jury’s verdict, the Delaware District Court held that “[s]ubstantial evidence
supports the conclusion that Lucas sells [the component] that [is] used or sold within the United States.”31
Since “a finding of contributory infringement . . . does not unreasonably extend the territorial scope of [the]
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patents,” the court had “no trouble concluding that § 271(c) thus provides ample statutory authority to hold
[the foreign manufacturer] liable as an infringer” because of its foreign sales.32 Additionally, in Endress &
Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Systems, the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found
contributory infringement by an Australian corporation because of its sale of an infringing component to its
American subsidiary, knowing that the subsidiary would resell the product in the United States.33 Judging
from these two decisions contemplating contributory infringement based on a directly infringing sale, courts
might be expected to treat similar situations where the direct infringement is an importation in the same
manner.
CONCLUSION
¶19

The existence of pre-Uruguay Round Agreements Act case law in which foreign

manufacturers/sellers were found liable for contributory infringement based on their activities abroad suggest
that there may be similar liability imposed where the buyer’s direct infringement was the importation of the
product. However, this is dependent upon courts interpreting the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act as merely
adding the two additional exclusive rights (“offer to sell” and “import”) to § 271(c), and not adding
geographic limitations. This is important because a showing of direct infringement by the foreign
manufacturer in such a case has proven difficult and a showing of active inducement to infringe requires the
plaintiff to show a higher degree of intent by the alleged inducing infringer. The remaining difficulty with
alleging contributory infringement under § 271(c) is that the product sold by the foreign company may have
to be a component of an infringing product as the language of § 271(c) provides. It is unclear whether a
foreign company could be found liable for contributory infringement based on its foreign sale of a complete
infringing product. Recognizing an action for contributory infringement against foreign sellers when buyers
import the infringing products into the U.S. could apply to situations in which it would seem fair to impose
liability given the seller’s knowledge of their buyer’s infringing importation.
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